21. Major Accidents and Disasters

21.1. Introduction

This chapter of the Offshore Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Report presents the assessment of the likely significant effects (as per the “EIA Regulations”) on the environment of the Berwick Bank Wind Farm offshore infrastructure which is the subject of this application (hereafter referred to as “the Proposed Development”) on the vulnerability of the Proposed Development to risks of major accidents and disasters. Specifically, this chapter considers the potential impacts of the Proposed Development seaward of Mean High Water Springs (MHWS) during the construction, operation and maintenance, and decommissioning phases.
Likely significant effect is a term used in both the “EIA Regulations” and the Habitat Regulations. Reference to likely significant effect in this Offshore EIA Report refers to “likely significant effect” as used by the “EIA Regulations”. This Offshore EIA Report is accompanied by a Report to Inform Appropriate Assessment (RIAA) which uses the term as defined by the Habitats Regulations Appraisal (HRA) Regulations.
The assessment presented is informed by the following technical chapters:

volume 1, chapter 3: Project Description;
volume 2, chapter 12: Commercial Fisheries;
volume 2, chapter 13: Shipping and Navigation;
volume 2, chapter 14: Aviation, Military, Communications; and
volume 2, chapter 17: Infrastructure and Other Users.
1. The structure of the Major Accidents and Disasters Offshore EIA Report chapter deviates from the structure of other chapters included within the Offshore EIA Report as the assessment is guided by the Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment (IEMA) ‘Major Accidents and Disasters in EIA: A Primer’ guidance (IEMA, 2020).
2. This guidance defines a major accident as an event that threatens immediate or delayed serious environmental effects to human health, welfare, and/or the environment. Additionally, major accidents can be caused by disasters resulting from both man-made and natural hazards. A disaster can therefore be an external hazard (an act of terrorism) or a natural hazard (an earthquake) with the potential to cause an even and/or situation that meets the definition of a major accident.

21.2. Purpose of this Chapter

The primary purpose of the Offshore EIA Report is outlined in volume 1, chapter 1. It is intended that the Offshore EIA Report will provide the Scottish Ministers, statutory and non-statutory stakeholders, with sufficient information to determine the likely significant effects of the Proposed Development on the receiving environment.
This Major Accidents and Disasters Offshore EIA Report chapter:

presents the existing environmental baseline established from desk studies, site-specific surveys and consultation with stakeholders;
identifies any assumptions and limitations encountered in compiling the environmental information;
presents the likely significant environmental effects deriving from the vulnerability of the Proposed Development to risks of major accidents and disasters, based on the information gathered and the analysis and assessments undertaken;
highlights any necessary monitoring and/or mitigation measures which are recommended to prevent, minimise, reduce or offset the likely significant adverse environmental effects of the Proposed Development on major accidents and disasters.

21.3. Policy and Legislative Context

Policy and legislation on offshore renewable energy infrastructure is presented in volume 1, chapter 2 of the Offshore EIA Report. Policy and legislation specifically in relation to major accidents and disasters are provided in Table 21.1 Open ▸ , with a list of the national planning policy relevant to the assessment of the effects on major accidents and disasters receptors set out in Table 21.2 Open ▸ .

Table 21.1: Legislation Relevant to Major Accidents and Disasters

Table 21.2: National Planning Policy Relevant to Major Accidents and Disasters

21.4. Consultation

A summary of the key issues raised during consultation activities undertaken to date specific to major accidents and disasters is presented in Table 21.3 Open ▸ , together with how these issues have been considered in the production of this Major Accidents and Disasters Offshore EIA Report chapter. Further detail is presented within volume 1, chapter 5.

Table 21.3: Summary of Key Consultation Issues Raised During Consultation Activities Undertaken for the Proposed Development Relevant to Major Accidents and Disasters

21.5. Methodology to Inform Baseline

21.5.1. Desktop Study

The baseline presented for major accidents and disasters is based on a summary of the information collected through a detailed desktop review of existing studies and datasets for the following chapters:

volume 2, chapter 12: Commercial Fisheries;
volume 2, chapter 13: Shipping and Navigation;
volume 2, chapter 14: Aviation, Military, Communications; and
volume 2, chapter 17: Infrastructure and Other Users.
1. The designed in mitigation measures are summarised in Table 21.4 Open ▸ . A detailed overview of the desktop sources is presented in each of the above chapters, with a summary being provided in this chapter.

21.5.2. Site-Specific Surveys

No specific site-specific surveys have been undertaken to inform the EIA for major accidents and disasters. This is because receptor information and data related to this topic can be readily collected through desktop study and consultation with relevant stakeholders, with suitable data throughout the Forth and Tay Region being currently available.
Furthermore, the baseline presented in this chapter has been informed by the site-specific surveys undertaken for the shipping and navigation chapter (volume 2, chapter 13).
A detailed overview of the methodology of the shipping and navigation site-specific surveys for the Proposed Development is presented in volume 2, chapter 13. A summary of the results is provided in paragraph 20 of this chapter.

21.6. Baseline Environment

21.6.1. Overview of Baseline Environment

This section provides an overview of the baseline environment relevant to major accidents and disasters including offshore energy projects, offshore cables and pipelines, carbon capture, natural gas storage and underground gasification, oil and gas, commercial fisheries, civil and military aviation and shipping and navigation. It is recognised that the study areas for these different baseline topics differ as they relate to different receptors with varying ranges for which impacts must be considered. However, notwithstanding these differences all relevant study areas are appropriate for this assessment. The summaries presented within this section are based on the detailed baseline environments presented within the following chapters:

Berwick Bank Wind Farm Offshore Scoping Report (SSER, 2021a).
volume 2, chapter 10: Marine Mammals;
volume 2, chapter 12: Commercial Fisheries;
volume 2, chapter 13: Shipping and Navigation;
volume 2, chapter 14: Aviation, Military, Communications; and
volume 2, chapter 17: Infrastructure and Other Users.

Commercial fisheries

This section provides an overview of the commercial fisheries in proximity to the Proposed Development, as described in volume 2, chapter 12.
Demersal trawling for Nephrops concentrates in inshore areas of the commercial fisheries study area, predominantly within the 6 nm limit, including in areas that overlap with the Proposed Development export cable corridor. However, within the Proposed Development array area, negligible levels of trawling for Nephrops generally occur.
Creeling, targeting lobster and crab, is undertaken at higher levels in inshore areas of the commercial fisheries study area. Although at relatively lower level, considerable activity by local creelers has also been reported in areas further offshore, including the Proposed Development array area, particularly around its north-western section.
Scallop dredging by vessels over 15 m in length (typically nomadic vessels) is undertaken at moderate levels within the Proposed Development array area, being predominantly concentrated in its north-western section. The level of activity recorded within the Proposed Development is however relatively low compared to that recorded in other grounds around Scotland and the UK that are targeted by the nomadic scallop fleet.

Shipping and navigation

This section provides an overview of the shipping and navigation activity in proximity to the Proposed Development, as described in volume 2, chapter 13.
During the summer vessel traffic survey an average of 14 unique vessels per day were recorded within 10 nm of the Proposed Development array area, with the main vessel types being tankers (34%), cargo vessels (30%) and commercial fishing vessels (18%). During the winter vessel traffic survey an average of 16 unique vessels per day were recorded within 10 nm of the Proposed Development array area, with the main vessel types being cargo vessels (36%), tankers (32%) and commercial fishing vessels (16%). Although, passenger vessels were not present in the vessel traffic surveys, an analysis of long term vessel traffic data indicated an average of one unique passenger vessel every two days within 10 nm of the Proposed Development array area, with this discrepancy attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic and confirmed during consultation.
From desktop studies, key navigational features were identified including other offshore wind farms, ports and related services and aids to navigation. In particular, there are four other large scale offshore wind farm developments within the Outer Firth of Forth: Seagreen 1 (located 2.1 nm to the north and under construction), Inch Cape (located 2.1 nm to the west and consented), Neart na Gaoithe (NnG) (located 7.8 nm to the west and under construction) and Seagreen 1A (located 2.7 nm to the west and consented).

Aviation, military and communications

This section provides an overview of the aviation, military and communications activity in proximity to the Proposed Development, as described in volume 2, chapter 14.
The Proposed Development is situated in an area of Class G uncontrolled airspace which is established from the surface up to Flight Level (FL) 115 (11,500 ft) which is the base of Airway P18 which is Class D controlled airspace. Airway P18 is primarily used by commercial aircraft routing to, and from, Aberdeen Airport. The airway is active from FL 115 (11,500 ft) to FL 195 (19,500 ft) in the north-west section of the Proposed Development and from FL 155 (15,500 ft) to FL 195 (19,500 ft) in the south-west section. The north-eastern portion of the Proposed Development overlaps the lateral boundaries of Danger Areas D613C and D613D. These Danger Areas are activated periodically from FL 100 (10,000 ft) to FL 660 (66,000 ft) for military air combat training and supersonic flight.
Within Class G and D airspace, the following Air Traffic Control (ATC) rules apply:

Class G airspace - any aircraft can operate in this area of uncontrolled airspace without any mandatory requirement to be in communication with, or receive a radar service from, any ATC unit. Pilots of aircraft operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) in Class G airspace are ultimately responsible for seeing and avoiding other aircraft and obstructions; and
Class D airspace is established from FL 115 (11,500 ft) to FL 195 (19,500 ft). All aircraft operating in this airspace must be in receipt of an air traffic service from National Air Traffic Services En-Route PLC (NERL) or military controllers located at the NERL Area Control Centre.
1. An overview of the baseline presented in volume 2, chapter 14 is provided below:
Military aviation: Ministry of Defence (MoD) Leuchars Station is located approximately 30.9 nm (57.22 km) to the south-west of the Proposed Development. Located at Leuchars Station is an ATC radar which is used to provide navigational services to aircraft inbound to and outbound from the aerodrome. In addition, Leuchars Station is responsible for navigational services to transitory military and civil aircraft operating within a 40 nm radius of the aerodrome, up to 9,500 ft. The Deadwater Fell ATC radar is located at Spadeadam is approximately 59.6 nm (110.5 km) to the south-west of the Proposed Development.
Civil aviation: NERL operate two ATC radars to the north north-west of the Proposed Development; Perwinnes ATC radar at approximately 46 nm (85 km) and Allanshill ATC radar at approximately 74 nm (137 km). These radars are used to support civilian ATC radar and en route operations for aircraft operating on civilian air routes and for aircraft arriving and departing to/from Aberdeen Airport.

Offshore energy projects, offshore cables, pipelines and subsea communications infrastructure

This section provides an overview of the offshore energy projects and offshore cables in proximity to the Proposed Development, as described in volume 2, chapter 17.
The closest offshore wind farm projects to the Proposed Development array area are the NnG offshore wind farm (under construction), Inch Cape offshore wind farm (consented), the Seagreen 1 offshore wind farm (under construction), Seagreen 1A Project (consented) and the Seagreen 1A Export Cable Corridor (consented). There are two planned subsea cables within the vicinity of the Proposed Development array area and export cable corridor (Eastern Link 1 and Eastern Link 2). In the nearshore region, the Proposed Development export cable corridor also crosses the export cable corridor for the NnG offshore wind farm (crossing will take place approximately 4 km offshore).
The Firth of Forth supports oil and gas activities such as those associated with the Grangemouth refinery, oil storage and tanker terminals. However, there are currently no active licence blocks located within or near the Proposed Development.
There are several overlaps of non-active licence blocks with the Proposed Development array area, namely blocks 25/20, 26/16, 26/17, 26/18, 26/21, 26/22, 26/23, 26/24, 26/27, 26/28 and 26/29. The closest active licence block, Block 27/9 - North Sea Natural Resources Ltd, is located approximately 68 km from the Proposed Development array area and 84.6 km from the Proposed Development export cable corridor.
The closest pipeline (Everest to Teeside (Cats Trunkline) gas pipeline) is located approximately 102 km from the Proposed Development array area.
There are no wave and tidal projects, aggregate extraction sites, active disposal sites, or carbon capture, natural gas storage areas, active and disused subsea cables and pipelines identified within the boundary of the Proposed Development.

Unexploded Ordnance sites

This section provides an overview of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) in proximity to the Proposed Development, as described in volume 1, chapter 3.
It is possible that UXO originating from World War I or World War II may be encountered during the construction or installation of offshore infrastructure, which poses a health and safety risk where it coincides with the planned location of infrastructure and associated vessel activity.

Where it is not possible to avoid or relocate a UXO, the preferred method for UXO clearance is for a low order technique (subsonic combustion). Based on existing knowledge of the area (using information gathered from Seagreen 1, it has been assumed that there may be up to 14 UXO which require clearance. The majority are anticipated to be cleared by a low order technique (such as deflagration), however 10% of all clearance events may result in high order detonation (see volume 2, chapter 10).

The unplanned detonation of UXO has the potential to generate some of the highest peak sound pressures of all anthropogenic underwater sound sources (von Benda-Beckman et al., 2015), and are considered a high energy, impulsive sound source. The potential impacts of this activity will depend on noise source characteristics, the receptor species, distance from the sound source and noise attenuation within the environment. However, temporary loss in hearing is reversible and therefore not considered likely to lead to any long term effects on the individual and only a small proportion of respective populations could be potentially injured.

21.6.2. Future Baseline Scenario

The EIA Regulations require that “a description of the relevant aspects of the current state of the environment (baseline scenario) and an outline of the likely evolution thereof without development as far as natural changes from the baseline scenario can be assessed with reasonable effort, on the basis of the availability of environmental information and scientific knowledge” is included within the Offshore EIA Report.
In the event that the Proposed Development does not come forward, an assessment of the future baseline conditions has been carried out and is described within this section.

Offshore energy projects, offshore cables, pipelines and subsea communications infrastructure

There is potential for significant growth in offshore wind energy within Scotland, with the Scottish Government setting out plans to increase offshore wind capacity to 11 GW of energy installed by 2030. There are a number of sites along the coast of Scotland with operational offshore wind developments, another 4.9 GW of consented projects (Scottish Sectoral Marine Plan, 2020; Offshore Wind Scotland, 2021), and up to an additional up to 25 GW projects in the concept/early planning stage as part of the ScotWind leasing round (The Crown Estate, 2022).
Oil and gas are vital to Scotland and were responsible for nearly 90% of the country’s primary energy in 2015 (Scottish Government, 2021). Although the sector is seen as a critical and integral component to the economy, support for oil and gas programs moving forward will be conditional on the sector’s actions to facilitate sustainable energy transitions for the future (Scottish Government, 2021). Therefore, the baseline environment for oil and gas activity in the vicinity of the Proposed Development is uncertain.
The future baseline scenario for offshore cables, carbon capture storage, natural gas storage and underground coal gasification is subject to gradual change as new projects and/or sites are further identified.

Shipping and navigation

In relation to the current shipping and navigation baseline, it is anticipated that commercial vessel traffic will navigate around Inch Cape if and when construction commences as it does for NnG and Seagreen. It is assumed that alternative routes will typically maintain a minimum mean distance of 1 nm from future wind farm structures in line with industry good practice.
In terms of changes to vessel traffic volumes, two independent scenarios of potential growth in commercial vessel movements of 10% and 20% are estimated. These are considered conservative assumptions given that from consultation with Forth Ports there are no terminal or berth changes are planned which may affect vessel traffic in the future. Additionally, there are no commercial ferry routes planned.

Aviation, military and communications

As aviation stakeholders assess impacts on a case-by-case basis and in chronological order, for aviation, military and communications, there are no future baseline environment changes expected to affect the Proposed Development.

Commercial fisheries

As described in volume 3, section 12.7, demersal trawling for Nephrops and squid, creeling for lobster and crab and scallop dredging are the main fishing activities that take place in the commercial fisheries study area. These are all well-established fisheries with well-defined fishing grounds, particularly in the case of the Nephrops and the scallop fishery, given the substrate requirements of the target species. Therefore, in general terms, the main fishing grounds could be expected to remain consistent in the future.
In addition, the implementation of fisheries management measures within Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) such as spatial closures for certain fishing methods may affect the future distribution and levels of fishing activity in the commercial fisheries study area. More information on these management measures is provided in volume 3, appendix 12.1.
Over time, global climate change will result in changes to the marine environment, including on fish and shellfish populations of commercial importance. This could result in modifications to commercial fisheries practices in response to changes in species distribution, abundance and/or seasonal trends. In addition, changes in other factors such as, fishing gear methods and efficiency, fisheries legislation and regulations, including changes associated with the UK exit from the EU, or changes in the market may also influence the baseline. At this stage, it is not possible however to predict what these changes (e.g., climate change, changes in the fishing industry, UK exit from the EU etc.) may entail and how they may affect activities within the commercial fisheries study area therefore it has been assumed that the current baseline assessment presented reflects the future baseline scenario also.

Natural hazards and climate system

The future baseline for major accidents and disasters will evolve along a number of factors over the Proposed Development lifecycle.
Climate change is predicted to lead to a number of changes including: an increase in peak rainfall intensities and resulting flood flows over time, with wetter winters and drier warmer summers; a rise in sea level. It is anticipated that there will be an increased frequency of lightning strikes and wind gusts. Climate change is expected to alter the prevalence of extreme weather conditions which could lead to disaster during different project phases (e.g. increased wind gusts impacting the construction phase or increased lightning strike frequency increasing risks during the operation and maintenance phase).
The magnitude of changes brought about by climate change is uncertain, but UK climate projections (UK CP18) are available until the end of the 21st century. The anticipated impact of climate change on environmental conditions is considered in volume 3, appendix 21. The effects of climate change on anticipated weather conditions within the construction phase are anticipated to be minimal.
There could be changes in land or water use in the surrounding environment; water use and climate change factors could impact the local ecology and associated environmental designations. These changes are anticipated to be gradual in nature and as there is minimal potential for major accidents during the all project phases, this is unlikely to have a significant impact.
Substantial development of technology during the lifetime of the Proposed Development is anticipated. This could include advances in power generation, power transmission, and decommissioning/maintenance techniques. These may reduce the risk posed to safety and the environment further. However, changes in technology may also introduce new hazards that would need to be managed at the appropriate time and through the appropriate process.
The framework in place is based upon risk assessment and risk management principles which are flexible and adaptable to changing context and environmental factors but will ensure that the risk of major accidents and disasters is reduced as low as reasonably practicable.
Other potential extreme natural hazards such as earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis, etc. are not relevant to the baseline hazard conditions in the vicinity of the Proposed Development.

21.6.3. Data Limitations

The data sources used in this chapter are based on the existing studies, datasets and limitations presented within the following chapters:

volume 2, chapter 10: Marine Mammals;
volume 2, chapter 12: Commercial Fisheries;
volume 2, chapter 13: Shipping and Navigation;
volume 2, chapter 14: Aviation, Military, Communications;
volume 2, chapter 17: Infrastructure and Other Users; and
volume 3, appendix 21: Climate Assessments Report.
1. The data presented are the most up to date publicly available information which can be obtained from the applicable data sources as cited in the relevant chapters. The data are therefore limited by what is available and by what has been made available, at the time of writing the Offshore EIA Report. It is considered that the data employed in the assessment are robust and sufficient for the purposes of the assessment of effects presented.

21.7. Methodology for Assessment of Effects

21.7.1. Overview

The major accidents and disasters assessment of effects has followed the methodology set out in the following guidance:

Major Accidents and Disasters in EIA: A Primer (Institute of Environmental Management & Assessment (IEMA), September 2020).
1. This approach directs the assessment to focus on low likelihood but potentially high consequence events such as a major spill, explosion, fire, etc. Smaller incidents (spills, sediment loss, etc.) are addressed elsewhere in the Offshore EIA Report in the relevant topic chapters and this chapter therefore focuses on major events only.
2. The approach to assessment in this chapter includes three steps: screening, scoping and assessment. The screening stage identifies if a development has a vulnerability to major accidents and/or disasters and to consider whether a development could lead to a significant effect. The scoping stage is to determine in more detail whether there is potential for significant effects as a result of major accidents and/or disasters associated with a development. The assessment stage provides further understanding on the likelihood of a risk event occurring and identifies the requirement for further mitigation.
3. In addition, the major accidents and disasters assessment of effects has considered the legislative framework as defined by Health and Safety at Work, etc Act 1974 and its relevant statutory provisions, although it should be noted that under Great Britain’s health and safety legislation, HSE does not have a role in examining risk or hazard assessments unless the circumstances are covered by specific regulations.

21.8. Measures Adopted as part of the Proposed Development

As part of the project design process, a number of measures have been proposed to reduce the potential for impacts within the following chapters (outlined in Table 21.4 Open ▸ ):

volume 2, chapter 10: Marine Mammals;
volume 2, chapter 12: Commercial Fisheries;
volume 2, chapter 13: Shipping and Navigation;
volume 2, chapter 14: Aviation, Military, Communications;
volume 2, chapter 17: Infrastructure and Other Users; and
volume 3, appendix 21: Climate Assessments Report.
1. As there is a commitment to implementing these measures described within each chapter listed above, they are considered inherently part of the design of the Proposed Development and have therefore been considered in the assessment presented in section 21.9. These measures are considered standard industry practice for this type of development.

Table 21.4: Designed In Measures Adopted as Part of the Proposed Development

21.9. Assessment

21.9.1. Identification and Screening

Following the guidance outlined within IEMA (2020) and given the location of the Proposed Development, the Proposed Development has a vulnerability to major accidents and/or disasters and therefore this has been screened into assessment included in this Offshore EIA Report.
Although there are a significant number of designed in measures in place, a full assessment of the vulnerability of the Proposed Development to risks of major accidents and disasters has been undertaken with consideration given to the potential for the Proposed Development to result in a major accident or disaster.

21.9.2. Scoping

The scoping stage determines whether there is potential for significant effects as a result of major accidents and/or disasters associated with a development considering the designed in measures. The scoping stage identifies whether accidents or disasters should be scoped in or out of the assessment stage for the Proposed Development.
Table 21.5 Open ▸ outlines the scoping of the vulnerability of the Proposed Development to the baseline anthropogenic and biogenic sources of hazards which have potential for significant adverse impact.

Table 21.5: Scoping of Vulnerability of the Proposed Development to Existing Accidents and Disasters

In addition to the existing baseline pressures, the Proposed Development will introduce additional pressures that may give rise to the potential for accidents to impact on the receiving environment, these are listed in Table 21.6 Open ▸ . As before, each pressure is assessed individually and scoped in/out of further assessment and a justification for scoping is provided.
The Proposed Development includes designed in measures adopted as part of the Proposed Development that will reduce the potential for any accidents during construction, operation and maintenance and decommissioning. These are outlined in Table 21.4 Open ▸ .

Table 21.6: Scoping of Vulnerability of the Proposed Development to Cause Accidents and Disasters

21.9.3. Assessment

Following the guidance outlined within IEMA (2020), all scoped in risk events have been assessed, both in terms of the Proposed Developments potential vulnerability to existing major accident and/or disasters and in terms of its potential to cause accidents/disasters. Multidiscipline impacts, designed in control measures and the potential requirement of additional control measures are considered in assessing whether each potential risk event is being managed to an acceptable level.
Table 21.7 Open ▸ details the assessment of the vulnerability of and potential for the Proposed Development to be impacted or cause major accidents and/or disasters.

Table 21.7: Assessment of Vulnerability of and Potential for the Proposed Development to be Impacted or Cause Accidents and/or Disasters

21.10. Cumulative Transboundary and Interrelated Effects Assessment

As it has been concluded that the project will not reasonably lead to a major accident or disaster after consideration of the designed in measures adopted, no assessment of cumulative, inter-related or transboundary effects has been undertaken.

21.11. Conclusion

Information on major accidents and disasters was collected through a desktop review of the following chapters (and the Berwick Bank Wind Farm Offshore Scoping Report) to establish the baseline for offshore energy projects, offshore cables and pipelines, carbon capture, natural gas storage and underground gasification, oil and gas, commercial fisheries, civil and military aviation, shipping and navigation and UXO:

Berwick Bank Wind Farm Offshore Scoping Report (SSER, 2021a).
volume 2, chapter 10: Marine Mammals;
volume 2, chapter 12: Commercial Fisheries;
volume 2, chapter 13: Shipping and Navigation;
volume 2, chapter 14: Aviation, Military, Communications; and
volume 2, chapter 17: Infrastructure and Other Users.
1. Table 21.7 Open ▸ details the assessment of the vulnerability of and potential for the Proposed Development to be impacted or cause major accidents and/or disasters. It was found that all reasonable worst consequences will be managed to an acceptable level with existing control measures in place.
2. As no reasonable major accidents and disasters risk events were identified, no cumulative, transboundary or interrelated effects assessment was required.

21.12. References

CAA (2016). CAP 393, Air Navigation: The Order and the Regulations (2016). Available at: Regulations made under powers in the Civil Aviation Act 1982 and the Air Navigation Order 2016 (caa.co.uk). Accessed on: 12 November 2021.

CAA (2016). CAP 764 - CAA Policy and Guidelines on Wind Turbines (Version 6, February 2016). Available at: https://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP764%20Issue6%20FINAL%20Feb.pdf. Accessed on: 12 November 2021.

CIRIA (2015) Assessment and management of unexploded ordnance (UXO) risk in the marine environment (C754). Available at: https://www.thenbs.com/PublicationIndex/documents/details?Pub=CIRIA&DocID=313715 Accessed on: 24 October 2022.

Defra (2007). The Air Quality Strategy for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, HMSO.

IALA (2021). IALA Guideline G1162 The Marking of Offshore Man-Made Structures. Edition 1.0. Saint Germain en Laye, France: IALA.

IEMA (2020). Major Accidents and Disasters in EIA: A Primer. Available at: Major Accidents and Disasters in EIA: An IEMA Primer. Accessed on: 16 September 2022.

IMO (1972/77). Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) – Annex 3. London: IMO.

IMO (1974). International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). London: IMO.

MCA (2021). Marine Guidance Note 654 (Merchant and Fishing) safety of Navigation: offshore Renewable Energy Installations (OREIs) – Guidance on UK Navigational Practice, Safety and Emergency Response. Southampton: MCA.

RYA (2019). UK Coastal Atlas of Recreational Boating 2.1. Southampton: RYA.

Scottish Government (2021). Oil and Gas. Glasgow. The Scottish Government.

SSER (2021a). Berwick Bank Wind Farm Offshore Scoping Report. Available at: https://berwickbank-eia.com/offshore-scoping/

The Crown Estate (TCE) (2022). Awards: Lead Applicants, Project Partners, Area, Capacity and Foundations. Available at: scotwind-list-of-successful-project-partners-170122 (crownestatescotland.com). Accessed on: 10 August 2022.

von Benda-Beckmann, A.M, Aarts, G., Sertlek, H.O., Lucke, K., Verboom, W.C., Kastelein, R.A., Ketten, D.R., van Bemmelen, R., Peter, F., Lam, A., Kirkwood, R.J, Ainsli, M.A. (2015). Assessing the Impact of Underwater Clearance of Unexploded Ordnance on Harbour Porpoises (Phocoena phocoena) in the Southern North Sea. Aquatic Mammals 2015, 41(4), 503-523, DOI 10.1578/AM.41.4.2015.503

[1] The reasonable worst-case scenario anticipated, considering the likely severity and duration. A reasonable worst-case scenario is the worst plausible, not most likely, manifestation of the risk in question.