2. HRA Derogations Guidance and Precedent

2.1. Introduction

55. This section provides an overview of the guidance and precedent relating to HRA Stages 3 and 4: No Alternative Solutions, IROPI and Compensatory Measures.

2.2. Guidance

56. In preparing this Report a range of guidance has been reviewed and drawn upon, as listed below:

Scottish Guidance

• SNH (2010). SNH Guidance ‘Natura sites and the Habitats Regulations. How to consider proposals affecting SACs and SPAs in Scotland. The essential quick guide’.
• DTA (2015) Habitats regulations appraisal of plans: Guidance for plan-making bodies in Scotland.
• Scottish Government (2015). Scotland’s National Marine Plan: A Single Framework for Managing Our Seas.
• Scottish Government (2020a). Policy paper ‘EU Exit: The Habitats Regulations in Scotland’.
• DTA Ecology (2021a: in draft). Policy guidance document on demonstrating the absence of Alternative Solutions and imperative reasons for overriding public interest under the Habitats Regulations for Marine Scotland.
• DTA (2021b) Framework to Evaluate Ornithological Compensatory Measures for Offshore Wind. Process Guidance Note for Developers. Advice to marine Scotland.

UK Guidance

• Defra (2012). Habitats Directive: guidance on the application of article 6(4).
• Defra (2021a) Habitats regulations assessments: protecting a European site
• Defra (2021b). Draft best practice guidance for developing compensatory measures in relation to Marine Protected Areas.
• DTA (2021) The Habitats Regulations Assessment Handbook.

EU Guidance

• EC (revised 2018). Managing Natura 2000 Sites (MN 2000): The provisions of Article 6 of the Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC.
• EC (revised 2021). Guidance document on wind energy developments and EU nature legislation
• EC (revised 2021). Methodological guidance on the provisions of Article 6(3) and (4) of the Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC and Annex (the EC Methodological Guidance);
  57. The Scottish Government recently provided draft guidance on HRA stages 3 and 4, specifically for offshore wind in Scotland, to OWF developers for comment. This draft guidance is divided into Alternative Solutions and IROPI (DTA, 2021a: in draft) and compensation measures (DTA 2021b)[11].
  58. This draft guidance is referenced in this Report; however, its status is currently unknown and no particular reliance is placed upon it. The draft DTA guidance is generally a restatement of principles evident from European, UK and/or Scottish jurisprudence or guidance. As such, whilst the draft DTA guidance (if formalised) is a useful additional resource, it did not introduce new principles or concepts which are necessary to be relied upon in this case. If it is not subsequently adopted by the Scottish Government, the principles referred to and relied upon in this Report remain valid and supporting references have been provided where relevant.

2.3. EC Opinions

59. Where it is proposed to rely upon an HRA derogation concerning a European site hosting a priority habitat and/or a priority species, in certain circumstances it is necessary for EU member states to obtain an opinion from the EC[12]. Following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, the UK is no longer subject to this requirement.
60. The EC has adopted and published a number of opinions on Article 6(4) derogation cases between 1996 and 2022[13]. These EC opinions have also been reviewed and considered; however each EC opinion is project and fact specific and none concern an OWF project. Furthermore, all of the opinions concern cases concerning priority habitat and/or priority species, which is not applicable in this case.

2.4. Planning Precedent

61. To date no HRA derogation cases for an OWF in Scottish waters have been submitted to or relied upon by the Scottish Ministers. However, in the wider UK, there have been five OWF which have received consent pursuant to a derogation. None of these decisions has been subject to legal challenge on grounds relating to the approach taken for the HRA derogation.
62. In the absence of planning decisions for Scottish OWF which rely upon an HRA derogation, it is appropriate and useful to consider and refer to UK OWF planning decisions as a guide on the types of evidence and scenarios. These UK OWF planning decisions have been made under the same legal framework[14], against the background of the same guidance set out above.
63. The five OWF derogation cases to date have been considered by the SofS for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and all concern OWF in the North Sea. These are:

• Hornsea Three OWF (Hornsea Three) (BEIS, 2020);
• Norfolk Boreas OWF (Norfolk Boreas) (BEIS, 2021);
• Norfolk Vanguard OWF (BEIS 2022);
• East Anglia ONE North OWF (BEIS 2022); and
• East Anglia TWO OWF (BEIS 2022).
  64. There is one other OWF application which has presented a “without prejudice” derogation case (Hornsea Four, also in the North Sea, off the East Coast of England). A decision by the SofS on the Hornsea Four consent application is expected in February 2023.
  65. The most recent example of an offshore wind related HRA derogation case is The Crown Estate’s plan-level HRA for its Round 4 offshore wind leasing process. Following completion of its AA, The Crown Estate (TCE) concluded there was a risk of an AEOI with regards to the kittiwake feature of the Flamborough and Filey Coast SPA in-combination, and the sandbanks feature of the Dogger Bank SAC, alone or in-combination. As such, TCE prepared an HRA derogation case which was subsequently approved by BEIS allowing the Round 4 plan to proceed.
  66. A summary of applications which have included an HRA derogation cases is provided in Table 6   Open ▸ . Each example demonstrates how the HRA Derogation Provisions and associated guidance can be relied upon to consent OWFs (plan or project level), notwithstanding the identification of AEOI.

Table 6 OWF Derogation Cases relevant to The Proposed Development

3. Summary of Need Case

3.1. Introduction

67. As will be seen in Part B and Part C of this Report, HRA Stages 3A (Alternative Solutions) and 3B (IROPI) are intertwined with and framed by the need for a given project. It is convenient to address the topic of need at this stage, to inform and limit later repetition in Parts B and C of this Report.
68. The factors which support and define the clear and urgent need case for The Project are set out comprehensively in the Applicant’s Statement of Need and Offshore Planning Statement and are only summarised below.
69. In short, the need case is predicated upon the critical contribution of The Project to four important pillars of energy policy:

1. Decarbonisation, to achieve “Net Zero” as soon as possible, to mitigate climate change;
2. Security of supply: geographically and technologically diverse supplies;
3. Affordability, energy at lowest cost to consumers;
4. Action before 2030: time is of the essence, meaning early deployment, at scale, is critical (owing to 1 – 3 above).

3.2. Climate Change, Net Zero and Decarbonisation

The Climate Emergency

70. Climate change is the defining challenge of our time. The impacts of climate change are global in scope and unprecedented in human existence.
71. The United Nations (UN) has been leading on global climate summits (‘Conference of the Parties”, COP) for nearly three decades. International consensus on the need to tackle climate change is reflected in The Paris Agreement[15], adopted at COP21 in 2015 by 196 parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. For the first time it created a legally-binding, international agreement towards tackling climate change. The UK (and hence Scotland) is legally bound to the Paris Agreement. The member governments agreed:

• A long-term goal of keeping the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels;
• To aim to limit the increase to 1.5°C since this would significantly reduce risks and the impacts of climate change;
• On the need for global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to peak as soon as possible; and
• To undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with the best scientific guidance available.
  72. This international ambition underpins subsequent Scotland and UK legislation on climate change mitigation, addressed below.
  73. However, despite action to date, human-induced warming has reached approximately 1ºC above pre-industrial levels, as confirmed by the recent Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 6th Assessment Report (the AR6 Report), published in three parts across 2021 and 2022. The AR6 Report is the first major review of the science of climate change since 2013 and is addressed in further detail in the Applicant’s Planning Statements and Statement of Need. Some of the key messages are as follows:
• Without immediate, rapid and large-scale reductions in GHG, limiting warming close to 1.5°C or even 2°C will be beyond reach.
• Delay in concerted global action will miss a brief and rapidly closing window to secure a liveable future.
• Limiting warming to around 1.5°C requires global GHG emissions to peak before 2025 at the latest, and be reduced by 43% by 2030
• Limiting global warming will require major transitions in the energy sector. This will involve a substantial reduction in fossil fuel use, widespread electrification, improved energy efficiency and use of alternative fuels.
  74. Thus, a key theme of the AR6 Report is that humanity is not on track to limit warming to the extent necessary, but that it is still just about possible to make the necessary progress by 2030 by, for example, moving rapidly to non-fossil fuel sources of energy. The next few years are critical.

Net Zero

75. The Scottish Government has recognised the gravity of the situation described above. Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon declared a "Climate Emergency" in her speech to the SNP Conference in April 2019. Climate Change Secretary Roseanna Cunningham subsequently made a statement to the Scottish Parliament on 14 May on the 'Global Climate Emergency' and said:

"There is a global climate emergency. The evidence is irrefutable. The science is clear and people have been clear: they expect action. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change issued a stark warning last year - the world must act now. By 2030 it will be too late to limit warming to 1.5 degrees.” [emphasis added].

76. An emergency is, by definition, a grave situation that demands an urgent response.
77. In Scotland and the UK legal obligations to achieve Net Zero, to mitigate climate change, have accordingly been strengthened in recent years as follows:

• Scotland: the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 was amended by the Climate Change (Emissions Reduction Targets) (Scotland) Act 2019; and
• UK: the Climate Change Act 2008 was amended by the Climate Change Act 2008 (2050 Target Amendment) Order 2019.
  78. The Scottish and UK Governments are now legally bound to reach Net Zero (i.e. ensure that their respective net carbon account is at least 100% lower than the 1990 baseline) by 2045 in Scotland and by 2050 in the UK.
  79. Challenging interim ‘stepping-stone’ targets are also in place. Scotland has interim targets of a 75% reduction target by 2030 and 90% by 2040. The 75% target by 2030 is especially challenging. The Committee on Climate Change (CCC) modelled five scenarios in CB6 and none – even the optimistic scenario – shows Scotland achieving a 75% emissions reduction by 2030. The CCC has therefore stated:

“Scotland’s 75% target for 2030 will be extremely challenging to meet, even if Scotland gets on track for net zero by 2045. Our balance net zero pathway for the UK would not meet Scotland’s 2030 target – reaching a 64% reduction by 2030 – while our most stretching tail winds scenario reaches a 69% reduction”.

80. COP26 was held in Glasgow in November 2021, allowing Scotland to demonstrate international leadership on climate change. COP26 recognised the urgent need to further reduce emissions before 2030 and parties made a commitment to revisit and strengthen their current emissions targets to 2030, in 2022. Agreements made at COP26 were detailed in the Glasgow Climate Pact (UNFCC, 2021[16]). Paragraph 17 states that “rapid, deep and sustained reductions in global greenhouse emissions” are required to limit temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial times.
81. The twenty seventh COP (COP27) took place in Sharm el-Sheikh in November 2022. The COP expressed “alarm and utmost concern that human activities have caused a global average temperature increase of around 1.1 °C above pre-industrial levels to date and that impacts are already being felt in every region and will escalate with every increment of global warming”[17] and agreed a package of decisions[18] which reaffirmed their commitment to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. However, it was acknowledged that current policies and actions are insufficient to achieve that objective.
82. The backdrop to COP27 was a report from UN Climate Change[19], which indicates that implementation of current pledges by national governments put the world on track for a 2.5°C warmer world by the end of the century. Therefore, despite some notable breakthroughs, such as an agreement to provide “loss and damage” funding for vulnerable countries hit hardest by climate disasters, in his closing remarks, Simon Stiell, UN Climate Change Executive Secretary, reminded delegates that the 2020s are a critical decade for climate action. Governments were tasked with revisiting and strengthening the 2030 targets in their national climate plans by the end of 2023, as well as accelerate efforts to phasedown unabated coal power and phase-out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.
83. In the field of energy, the Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan[20] repeated “the urgent need for immediate, deep, rapid and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions …across all applicable sectors, including through increase in low-emission and renewable energy,”. However, the Implementation Plan also recognised the importance of energy security of supply. It described an “unprecedented global energy crisis” which “underlines the urgency to rapidly transform energy systems to be more secure, reliable, and resilient, including by accelerating clean and just transitions to renewable energy during this critical decade of action”. This energy security of supply crisis underscores the importance of “enhancing a clean energy mix, including low-emission and renewable energy, at all levels as part of diversifying energy mixes and systems, in line with national circumstances and recognizing the need for support towards just transitions”.
84. In effect, the Scottish and UK Governments, in common with COP, have agreed that, beyond their own national targets, more must and can be done. This implies a greater target capacity of carbon-neutral power supply than currently pledged and a more rapid timeline for decarbonisation wherever possible.

Decarbonisation

85. Decarbonisation is the act of reducing the carbon footprint (primarily in the form of GHG) arising from the use of energy in society, to reduce the warming impact on the global climate.
86. The adoption of Net Zero commitments as described above requires a substantial reduction in the carbon emissions from transport, heat and industrial emissions.
87. This is reflected in Scottish and UK policy. The Scottish Energy Strategy (2017) establishes targets for 2030 to supply the equivalent of 50% of the energy for Scotland’s heat, transport and electricity consumption from renewable sources; and to increase by 30% the productivity of energy use across the Scottish economy (Scottish Government, 2017). Similarly, the UK Clean Growth Strategy (BEIS 2017) provides measures to decarbonise all sectors of the UK economy through the 2020s and beyond.
88. However, while multiple pathways for the energy mix could achieve the previous 80% C-reduction target, Net Zero leaves a narrower choice of pathways which will lead to success[21] and there is presently a gap between ambition and reality.

Ambitions Vs Reality Gap

89. Figure 1 below shows the gap in carbon emissions between current global decarbonisation policies, current pipelines and pledges, and (in green) the pathway required to be followed to ensure that global warming does not increase over 1.5C by 2100.

Figure 1 Global 2100 Warming Projections[22]

90. The world is lagging in decarbonisation progress and because carbon has a cumulative warming effect, targets associated with decarbonisation have correspondingly increased year-on-year. Therefore, although Scotland and the UK are leading decarbonisation efforts, their respective legal commitments of achieving Net Zero by 2045 and 2050 respectively are not assured. The climate challenge is such that there is currently no limit or cap to the benefit that single countries can bring in the fight against global warming.

The Need for AdditIonal Electricity Generating Capacity

91. Electricity generation is an important sector for climate change because, although historically a significant carbon emitter, it is now the critical enabler of deep decarbonisation across society. The decarbonisation of electricity is critical for Net Zero to be achieved and deeper decarbonisation requires deeper electrification.
92. Figure 2 below shows how National Grid’s Future Energy Scenarios electricity demand forecasts for GB have evolved from 2012 through to 2022.

Figure 2 Future Energy Scenarios demand forecasts 2012-2022[23]

93. Historical annual GB electricity demand is represented by the purple columns (declining with de-industrialisation and energy efficiency measures) and each yearly forecast is represented by a shaded area which shows the max and min forecast range per year for those scenarios which are compatible with Net Zero 2050.
94. Following the 2019 enshrinement into law of the Net Zero commitments, the 2020 and 2021 forecasts show a significant uplift versus previous year forecasts and are coloured blue for emphasis. The most recent forecast is bordered with a thin blue line.
95. Important points to note from Figure 2 are:

• Each year the forecast for electricity demand has increased, as the need to decarbonise has grown.
• Deeper decarbonisation draws power from other primary fuels (carbon intensive) to electricity which may, and needs, to be generated from low-carbon sources.
• Since Scotland and the UK committed to Net Zero, forecast future electricity demand has increased significantly and is now as high as it ever has been.
  96. UK government forecasts for electricity demand in the 2050 timeframe use the value of 600TWh/year – double today’s consumption – and this includes Scottish demand[24].

The Need for Additional Offshore Wind Deployment, at Scale

97. The UK has plentiful wind resource. Therefore, a significant focus of Scottish and UK energy policy is the vital role and need for rapid large-scale deployment of GWs of offshore wind. The policy is detailed fully in the Applicant’s Offshore and Onshore Planning Statements and Statement of Need but include:

• Revised National Planning Framework 4[25] – offshore wind developments proposed in excess of 50MW are categorised as “national development” (Strategic Renewable Electricity Generation and Transmission Infrastructure), the need for which is assumed.
• Offshore Wind Policy Statement[26] – sets an ambition for up to 11 GW of OWF by 2030;
• Scotland’s Energy Strategy Position Statement[27] – identifies offshore wind as a major component of Scottish energy strategy from the perspective of being an important low-carbon primary energy generator and from the perspective of continuing to develop world-leading support and development services to the global offshore wind industry.
• Scotland Sectoral Marine Plan for Offshore Wind[28] - identifies 15 Plan Option areas, split across 4 regions in Scottish waters, capable of generating up to 10 GW of renewable energy.
• Scotland’s National Marine Plan (2015) - includes the objectives of sustainable development of offshore wind in suitable locations, to contribute to achieving the decarbonisation target by 2030
• HM Government British Energy Strategy (2022) targeting 50 GW offshore wind by 2030
• Net Zero Strategy for the UK (HM Government, 2021a),
• Build Back Greener (HM Government, 2021a) goes on to take action so that by 2035, all the UK’s electricity will come from low carbon sources, including offshore wind;
• UK Offshore Wind Sector Deal (BEIS 2019)
• Energy White Paper (HM Government, 2020b);
• National Policy Statements (NPS) for England and Wales and draft NPS (EN-1, EN-3, EN-5)[29].
• Electricity System Operator National Grid ESO: Future Energy Scenarios requirement for 38 – 47 GW offshore wind in 2030, 68 – 83 GW in 2040, and 87 – 113 GW by 2050[30].
  98. In short, the need for a massive amount of additional offshore wind capacity is a very strong and constant theme of all extant Scottish and UK energy policy.
  99. National Grid’s Future Energy Scenarios contemplates the requirement for offshore wind (and other technologies) required to meet the forecast growth in electricity demand. Figure 3 below shows the forecast capacity of offshore wind from National Grid’s Future Energy Scenarios, with the same format protocol as shown in Figure 2 above.

Figure 3 Future Energy Scenarios offshore wind capacity forecasts 2012-2022[31]

100. Key points to note from Figure 3 are:

• Although the UK is leading the world in offshore wind, the currently installed capacity is significantly lower than it needs to be according to National Grid future energy scenarios.
• Since Net Zero, offshore wind is expected to play an enormous part in meeting the electricity needs of the UK in the future.
• In every scenario, a pathway to Net Zero includes a significant increase of offshore wind capacity (beyond that predicated in the Offshore Wind Sector Deal).
• Even “low-case” projections for offshore wind deployment – in which Net Zero will be met only if “hi-cases” for other technologies such as nuclear, CCUS, solar and onshore wind are met – represent a significant growth in installed capacity from today onwards.
  101. Importantly, these offshore wind projections need to be read and pursued in the knowledge that there is attrition during project development and not all proposed offshore wind projects reach commercial operation, and some do so at reduced scale, or later than planned. Therefore, consenting a much larger offshore wind capacity than provided for in the various targets, as quickly as possible, is necessary to meet Net Zero.
  102. In its 2021 progress report[32], the CCC emphasised that to achieve Net Zero requires a “rapid scale up in low carbon investment…..and speed up the delivery which will need to accelerate even where ambition is broadly on track. For example, although the Government’s 2030 target for offshore wind is in line with the CCC pathway, a minimum of 4 GW of additional offshore wind capacity will be needed each year from the mid-2020s onwards, significantly greater than the current 2 GW per year”. It should be noted that the target referred to in the above extract is the previous target of 40GW by 2030, which suggests that more than 4GW per year growth in offshore wind capacity is required from the mid-2020s to achieve the 50GW target.
  103. In conclusion, a massive increase in energy generation from offshore wind is important to reduce electricity-related emissions, and to provide a timely next-step contribution to a future generation portfolio which is capable of supporting the massive increase in electricity demand, which is expected because of decarbonisation through-electrification of transport, heat and industrial demand.

3.3. Security of Supply

104. Energy security is a key pillar of energy policy at Scottish, UK and EU levels.
105. Although Scotland has its own decarbonisation targets, the connectedness of the electricity systems across Great Britain means that security of supply and decarbonisation of the electricity sector need to be considered at the GB level. The electricity systems of Scotland, Wales and England are essentially one system.
106. Security of supply means keeping the lights on. That entails, amongst other things, ensuring that there is enough electricity generation capacity available to meet maximum peak demand (not just average demand), and with a safety margin or spare capacity to accommodate unexpectedly high demand and to mitigate risks such as unexpected plant closures and extreme weather events.
107. And while technologies such as batteries or hydrogen will ensure that peak demand is met by storing energy at times of oversupply and discharging it at times of overdemand, more renewable generation capacity is required to meet demand than would be required of conventional generation, because of its intermittent nature.
108. Recent European events have challenged the UK’s prevailing view on and approach to energy security, in particular UK dependency on foreign hydrocarbons. The British Energy Security Strategy (BESS), which applies across GB, was published by BEIS following concerns over the security of international hydrocarbon supplies and increasingly volatile international markets in early 2022.
109. Reducing the UK’s dependency on hydrocarbons is already essential for decarbonisation but recent world events have brought into sharp focus that reducing dependency on foreign hydrocarbons has important security of supply, electricity cost and fuel poverty avoidance benefits. Actions already urgently required in the fight against climate change are now required even more urgently for global political stability and insulation against dependencies on other nation states.
110. The UK imports 100 Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent (MTOE) of coal, oil and gas each year. Of this, approximately 8 MTOE arrives from Russia. 8 MTOE is equivalent to approximately 93 TWh of energy[33]. 8 MTOE is equivalent to approximately 93 TWh of energy[34].
111. 1 GW of offshore wind, at a conservatively assumed load factor of 48%, has the potential to generate 4.2TWh/year, or 4.5% of Russian energy imports averaged over 2019/2020. This metric also demonstrates the enormous challenge ahead to achieve national independence on Russian energy imports. The equivalent of 5 x Berwick Banks are needed to remove the need for any energy imports from Russia.
112. A diverse mix of all types of power generation helps to ensure security of supply, however a low-cost, net zero consistent system is likely to be composed predominantly of wind and solar[35]. The diversification of the GB’s electricity supplies through the commissioning of offshore wind assets to the NETS, alongside other low carbon generation technologies, provides benefits in the functioning of the NETS and ensuring power is available to consumers across the country when it is required, due to its requirement to operate within the stringent operability and control requirements of the Grid Code[36].
113. As part of a diverse generation mix, wind generation contributes to improve the stability of capacity utilisations among renewable generators. By being connected at the transmission system level, large-scale offshore wind generation can and will play an important role in the resilience of the GB electricity system from an adequacy and system operation perspective. Further generation of offshore wind in Scotland will avoid the need for more / extended imports of electricity from the wider UK to meet its growing electricity demand. It will also ensure a lower carbon content of electricity owing to Scotland being further ahead than the wider UK in decarbonising its electricity supply.
114. This demonstrates how offshore wind has, and must continue to contribute, to security of supply for GB consumers through being a dependable supply of low carbon power. Further details are set out in the Applicant’s Statement of Need.

3.4. Affordability

115. In Just Transition: A Fairer, Greener Scotland[37], the Scottish Government identified its priority to achieve a “just transition” to Net Zero, that is to deliver the desired outcome – a net zero and climate resilient economy – in a way that delivers fairness and tackles inequality and injustice.
116. The UK and especially Scotland has plentiful wind resource and costs are competitive versus other technologies, which is an important factor in ensuring affordability for consumers. This is reflected in the Offshore Wind Policy Statement[38], which states (page 2):

“Offshore wind is one of the lowest cost forms of electricity generation at scale, offering cheap, green electricity for consumers, with latest projects capable of generating power at below wholesale electricity prices.”

117. Cost reduction and affordability have been particularly important in the development of OWF development. UK policy and regulatory objectives seek to ensure affordability to consumers, through the Contract for Difference (CfD) auction process (generation assets) and Offshore Transmission Owner regime (offshore transmission assets).
118. In broad terms, both seek to incentivise investment in low carbon electricity generation and transmission assets, ensure security of supply and help the UK meet its carbon reduction and renewables targets, whilst reducing cost to the consumer.
119. The CfD mechanism plays a very important role in bringing forwards new large-scale low carbon generation, and Allocation Round 4 (AR4) contracts awarded in the summer of 2022 provide an indicator of the importance of wind as a technology class within the GB electricity system, and an indicator of the competitive cost of the technology: over 8.5GW of wind capacity across 22 projects secured Contracts for Difference in AR4, at an initial strike price ranging from £37.35/MWh (Offshore Wind) to £87.30/MWh (Floating Offshore Wind). All CfDs commence in either 2024/25 (Onshore Wind) or 2026/27 (all Offshore Wind technologies).
120. As a result, Scottish and UK OWF projects are increasing in capacity, and decreasing in unit cost. Hitherto, each subsequent project has provided a real-life demonstration that size and scale works for new offshore wind, for the benefit of consumers. Other conventional low-carbon generation (e.g. tidal, nuclear or conventional carbon with Carbon Capture, Utilisation and Storage) remain important contributors to achieving the 2050 Net Zero obligation, but their contributions will not be significant in the 2020s due to the associated technical, commercial and development timeframes.
121. For the reasons summarised above, the economic and technical competitiveness for offshore wind makes it the preferential power supply to the Scotland and GB electricity consumer. Further details are set out in the Applicant’s Statement of Need.

3.5. The Need for Action Before 2030

122. Both the Scottish Energy Strategy[39] and the UK Net Zero Strategy[40] make a case for a low or no regrets approach to decarbonisation. This framework, set by the Nation Engineering Policy Centre (2017) promotes rapid decision making in net zero policy in order to make urgent progress.
123. The Scottish Energy Strategy thus sets a 2030 target to supply the equivalent of 50% of the energy for Scotland’s heat, transport and electricity consumption from renewable sources; and to increase by 30% the productivity of energy use across the Scottish economy. Scotland’s Offshore Wind Policy Statement in turn sets an ambition (but not limit) for 11 GW of offshore wind capacity in operation in Scottish waters by 2030.
124. There is good reason for this focus on near-term action before 2030. The need for decarbonisation grows stronger each year. Every year during which no action is taken, more carbon is released into the atmosphere, global temperatures rise and the global warming effect accelerates. A rise in global temperatures above 1.5°C has potential to cause irreversible climate change, the potential for widespread loss of life and severe damage to livelihoods.
125. Therefore, early action, during the 2020s, will have a correspondingly more beneficial impact on our ability to meet Net Zero targets than later action.
126. In June this year the International Energy Agency issued a call to arms on energy innovation, stating that the world “won’t hit climate goals unless energy innovation is rapidly accelerated... About three-quarters of the cumulative reductions in carbon emissions to get on [a path which will meet climate goals] will need to come from technologies that have ‘not yet reached full maturity”[41]. DNV GL expressed this observation in a different way: "Measures today will have a disproportionately higher impact than those in five to ten years’ time”[42].
127. Time is of the essence and action during the 2020s is critical.

3.6. Role of and Need for The Project

128. Against the backdrop outlined above, the need for and benefits of the Project are manifest and include:

• With the potential to generate an estimated 4.1GW, the Project is a substantial infrastructure asset, capable of delivering huge amounts of low-carbon electricity – enough to power more than 5 million homes each year, starting from as early as 2026.
• The Project would deliver a substantial near-term contribution to decarbonisation, helping to reduce GHG emissions, by offsetting millions of tonnes of CO2 emissions per annum from 2026.
• More than 4.1GW of OWF capacity is required in Scotland and the wider UK to meet policy aims and legal targets for 2030. Any capacity not developed at the Project will need to be made up elsewhere and will not be on stream as quickly (most likely after 2030).
• Decarbonisation is urgent. The scale of and timelines associated with The Project align with that urgency. The 2030 ambition gap will be closed only by bringing forward projects like The Project which connect as much capacity as possible, as early as possible.
• The Project is the only Scottish offshore wind project of significant scale which is proposed to commission between 2025 and 2030 (with the exception of 0.8GW from a recent ScotWind lease winner, currently hoped to commission in 2029).
• The Project can “plug the gap” between Scottish CfD Auction Round 3 (AR3) wind farm developments (coming online in the next three years) and ScotWind developments (which are mostly likely to start to come on stream from the 2030s onwards).
• Development of The Project is well advanced and there is a high degree of certainty attached to its deliverability for a number of reasons including:

–      The seabed at The Project is shallower and closer to shore than seabed areas in other proposed OWF locations (e.g. ScotWind);

–      The shallow seabed allows for a fixed bottom turbines to be used, a tried and tested foundation solution which can be developed at lower cost than floating technology;

–      The seabed at The Project is well surveyed and understood; and

–      The established track record of the promoter, SSE, in delivering offshore wind in Scottish and UK waters.

• The Project’s location (shallow waters), design (fixed bottom turbines) and large scale (4.1GW):

–      supports UK electricity system adequacy to help meet peak electricity demand, dependability and security of supply requirements; growth in offshore wind capacities, is expected to improve the dependability of those assets as a combined portfolio, and to reduce further any integration costs associated with such growth;

–      enables efficiencies and reduce costs, ensuring affordability for the GB consumer

–      brings forward an important near-term opportunity for supply chain investment in Scotland

• If developed at its full technically achievable capacity, The Project would provide enough energy to replace 19% of Russian gas imports to the UK. This demonstrates the significant national benefit to energy security provided by a fully developed The Project scheme.
• The Project’s two separate points of connection are also beneficial from both system reinforcement and system operability cost perspectives.
  129. For all these reasons, The Project is an essential part of the future generation mix. Without The Project, it is probable that delivery of the multitude of policies will fall short, including: the Scotland Sectoral Marine Plan, Scottish Energy Strategy, the Ten Point Plan, UK Net Zero Strategy and UK Offshore Wind Sector Deal, as well as the targets set by the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, Climate Change (Emissions Reduction Targets) (Scotland) Act 2019, the (UK) Climate Change Act 2008 (as amended) and the Net Zero Strategy: Build back Greener.